Abstract: Madagascar's 3 rd Republic (1992Republic ( -2009 
INTRODUCTION
Owing to the great influence of the "Third Wave" of democratization and the pressure from the Malagasy people themselves, Didier Ratsiraka, the leader of the socialist regime of Madagascar since 1975, was forced to embrace democracy by the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. A new democratic constitution, instituting the 3 rd Republic (1992 Republic ( -2009 , was adopted by referendum in 1992, and democratic elections were held across the country the following years. Ratsiraka eventually lost the 1993 presidential election to one of the opposition leaders, Albert Zafy, and most of the members of his revolutionary party, Avant-garde de la Révolution Malgache (AREMA), also lost their seats at the National Assembly and at different levels of the national and local governments. As a result of these democratic developments, Freedom House classified Madagascar"s 3 rd Republic as "partly free" or an "electoral democracy" in 1993. 1 However, sixteen years later, Madagascar"s electoral democracy was anything but dead: once in power, the unelected president, Andry Rajoelina, was quick to suspend the 1992 Constitution, along with the National Assembly and the Senate. Indeed, under the pressure from the streets and the the "Third Wave" did not display the same strength and resilience as the established, "consolidated" ones, and reverted quickly to autocracy, as in the case of Madagascar in 2009. However, while the definition of the concept itself did not seem to pose any major problem, the different approaches to its study and the different components of the process of consolidation became controversial over the years. 7 Thus, although some scholars, like Andreas Schedler, talk about "conceptual confusion" and suggest up to five different definitions of the concept, 8 many other scholars agree with the minimalist definition proposed by Guiseppe di Palma in his famous expression: making democracy "the only game in town." 9 In this paper, we will refer to Larry Diamond"s definition which states that democratic consolidation is:
The process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for the society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine. Political competitors must come to regard democracy (and the laws, procedures, and institutions it specifies) as "the only game in town," the only viable framework for governing the society and advancing their own interests. 10 The literature of the study of democratic consolidation can be broadly categorized into two groups: the first group focuses on the agents or actors of democratic consolidation, which include the civil society organization, the political parties, the media, etc.; and the second group focuses on the different structural factors or determinants of democratic consolidation, which include the economic conditions (particularly the level of development or poverty), along with the political culture and institutions of the new democracies.
Larry Diamond and Raymond Suttner are among the scholars who focus on the important roles played by different agents or actors in the process of democratic consolidation.
the new democracies as major factors influencing democratic consolidation in one way or the other. Particularly, while suggesting a new approach to the study of democratic consolidation, Milan Svolik argued that "the level of economic development, type of democratic executive, and the type of authoritarian past determine whether a democracy consolidates." 14
Purpose and Research Questions
Instead of focusing on the agents or determinants of democratic consolidation, this article aims to identify the major obstacles and challenges to the process of democratic consolidation in the case of Madagascar"s 3 rd Republic. The identification of these obstacles and challenges is crucial in order to help this country to overcome its failures to consolidate democracy. In doing so, this article builds on the three generic tasks of democratic consolidation identified by Larry Diamond, in his seminal work, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, 15 and specifically addresses the following questions: Was Madagascar"s electoral democracy consolidating before its sudden death in 2009? If yes, to what extent? If not, what were the obstacles and challenges to democratic consolidation in this country?
Methodology
As mentioned earlier, Larry Diamond defines democratic consolidation as "the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for the society." 16 In connection with this definition, he also identifies three generic tasks, which according to him, "all new and fragile democracies must handle if they are to become consolidated."
17 These three generic tasks are:
-deepening democracy,
-political institutionalization, and -regime performance.
Thus, in order to address the question of whether Madagascar"s electoral democracy was consolidating or not under the 3 rd Republic, this article will analyze how each one of the above generic tasks was completed in this country. This analysis will then allow us to identify the obstacles and challenges to democratic consolidation in this country. Newspaper articles, along with data, reports and studies from different scholars and organizations, at the national and international levels will be used in this article to address the research questions.
MADAGASCAR'S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY AND THE THREE GENERIC TASKS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
This section focuses on how the three generic tasks of democratic consolidation were completed in Madagascar under the 3 rd Republic. As mentioned earlier, these three generic tasks are democratic deepening, political institutionalization, and regime performance.
Deepening Democracy
Deepening democracy means making "the formal structures of democracy more liberal, accountable, representative, and accessible --in essence, more democratic." 18 Larry Diamond recognizes that this task may overlap with the other tasks of democratic consolidation, but he emphasizes that decentralizing and devolving power to local governments, along with putting the military under civilian control are the most important subcategories of this task. In addition, in order to find out whether a new democracy is becoming more democratic or not, we can also refer to the assessments provided by different organizations and think tanks, such as Freedom House or Polity IV Project. 19 In this paper, we will specifically refer to the scores of political rights and civil liberties provided annually by Freedom House to assess the deepening or deterioration of democracy in Madagascar from 1992 to 2009.
Increasing Political Rights
Political rights are the foundation of any democratic regime. Freedom House defines political rights as rights that "enable people to participate freely in the political process," and assesses the political rights ratings of a country based "on an evaluation of three subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government." 20 In the case of Madagascar, the citizens" political rights were protected under the 1992 Constitution of the 3 rd Republic of Madagascar, 21 and the country received relatively high scores in terms of political rights from Freedom House until 2005 . 22 In connection with this, the great majority of the citizens also believed that they had the right to create or join political parties, as well as the right to choose freely the candidates they like during elections. 23 However, these political rights were frequently violated without any qualm, when they stood in the ways of the successive presidents and their political parties. 
Increasing Civil Liberties
Freedom House defines civil liberties as "the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state."
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In the same way as the political rights discussed earlier, the Malagasy people"s civil liberties were also protected under the 1992 Constitution of the 3 rd Republic of Madagascar. 27 As a result, the country also received decent scores in terms of civil liberties from Freedom House until 2009, 28 and the great majority of the Malagasy citizens believed that their freedoms of expression and belief were respected.
29
Nevertheless, on many occasions, these civil liberties were also trampled by the successive presidents, when they challenged the power of the latter. Particularly, Marc Ravalomanana shut down many radio and television stations during his two terms in office. 30 Thus, according to Jean-Loup Vivier, he closed down, in 2004 alone, one television station and five radio stations. 31 Many other television and radio stations were shut down later, including VIVA Television, which ultimately led to his downfall in 2009 . 32 In addition to the violation of the freedom of expression of the Malagasy citizens, Marc Ravalomanana also violated their freedom of religion, by closing down a popular Christian church (the FPVM) in 2005, 33 and by removing the "secular nature" of the state through a constitutional amendment in 2007. 34 In sum, these wide-range and repeated violations of civil liberties were also a clear sign of the deterioration of Madagascar"s electoral democracy before its sudden death in 2009.
Decentralizing and Devolving Power to Local Governments
According to Larry Diamond, devolution of power to local governments can improve democracy for the following reasons:
First, it helps to develop democratic values and skills among citizens. Second, it increases accountability and responsiveness to local interests and concerns. Third, it provides additional channels of access to power for historically marginalized groups and thus improves the representativeness of democracy. Fourth, it enhances checks and balances vis-à-vis power at the center. Fifth, it provides opportunities for parties and factions in opposition at the center to exercise some measure of political power. 35 In the case of Madagascar, the idea of decentralizing and devolving power to local governments was accepted and demanded by the great majority of people, and there was a willingness to implement this idea with the creation of "six autonomous provinces" by Didier Ratsiraka in 1998, and the creation of "22 regions" to replace these "autonomous provinces" by Marc Ravalomanana in 2004. However, the different ways in which these local governments were set up told a whole different story. 36 Instead of truly devolving power to local governments, the two presidents were actually tightening their control over the peripheral areas of the country, by delegating their power to trusted political allies, and hence extending their political networks throughout the country. The same drive to control, rather than to devolve power to local governments, was also shown by the creation of the "22 regions" by Marc Ravalomanana in 2004. Indeed, since the chiefs of regions were directly appointed by the president, not elected by the people, and since the objective was up to 3 in 2003, before it went down again to 4 in 2009. In fact, it is quite surprising that Freedom House was still giving Madagascar high scores on civil liberties, when these liberties were frequently violated in the country, especially under the presidency of Marc Ravalomanana (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) administrative efficiency, not popular representation, we have to recognize that the desire to control the whole country was more important for the president, than the need to devolve power to the regions. 37 In sum, according to the assessment by the World Bank, the decentralization and devolution in Madagascar were embryonic, as only 5% of the state budget was devoted to local governments, compared to 30% in developed country and 22% in South-East Asia and Latin America. 
Putting the Military Under Civilian Control
As Larry Diamond puts it, "[by] definition, democracy cannot be consolidated until the military becomes firmly subordinated to civilian control and committed to the democratic constitutional order." 39 In line with this, putting the military under civilian control is one of the most important keys to democratic consolidation. In the case of Madagascar, the World Bank finds that the military was already under civilian control, and was not the main driver of political change in the country. 40 In fact, the main problem with the Malagasy military was not its control by civilians, but its internal division, along with its politicization and instrumentalization by political leaders. In connection with this, both Marc Ravalomanana in 2002 and Andry Rajoelina in 2009 have "knocked at the barracks doors," and owed their rise to power to military interventions. 41 Additionally, Marc Ravalomanana appointed in 2007 Cecile Manorohanta as the first civilian and female Defense Minister of the country in order to weaken the military. 42 However, the unintended consequence of this appointment and Marc Ravalomanana"s own way of politicizing and instrumentalizing the military was that a widespread discontent emerged among officers and soldiers, which may explain the mutiny of the group of military based in the CAPSAT camp in March 2009 that ultimately led to the resignation of Marc Ravalomanana. Thus, paradoxically, in and of itself, putting the military under civilian control (with the risk of politicization, which would result from this move) did not solve the Malagasy military problem. Instead, there would be a need to give the military some autonomy and, following Larry Diamond"s suggestion, to "refocus the military's mission, training, and expenditure around issues of external security." 
Political Institutionalization
Besides the task of deepening democracy, that of political institutionalization constitutes also an important key to democratic consolidation. Larry Diamond defines political institutionalization as: "a move toward routinized, recurrent, and predictable patterns of political behavior. This involves the settled convergence around (and internalization of) common rules and procedures of political competition and action." 44 In line with this definition, the task of political institutionalization can be subdivided into to the following subtasks:
-Strengthening the Bureaucracy, -Strengthening Institutions of Governance, and -Strengthening Horizontal Accountability and Rule of Law.
Strengthening the Bureaucracy
Strengthening bureaucracy means making the "state bureaucracy usable." As Larry Diamond puts it:
To be usable and ultimately effective, the state must have technical talent and training, which require (particularly in its upper reaches) a professionalized, meritocratic bureaucracy with relatively good pay, competitive standards of recruitment, and ideally, an esprit de corps. Such a competent state is needed to improve education and other forms of human capital; to develop the physical, legal and institutional infrastructure of the market economy; to manage the macro economy with fiscal discipline and intelligent budgeting priorities; to negotiate with international trade partners, creditors, and investors; to control for negative externalities of the market of the market without overregulating it; to modernize and broaden the collection of taxes; to maintain order and rule of law.
45
In the case of Madagascar, the task of strengthening bureaucracy was daunting, as the bureaucracy of the country was generally weak since the country"s independence in 1960. While a systematic study of the Malagasy bureaucracy is yet to be conducted, two specific cases of bureaucratic deficiency and instrumentalization would be sufficient to demonstrate the scope of the problem.
On the one hand, in the case of the shutting down of VIVA Television, which led to the political crises of 2009 and the overthrow of president Marc Ravalomanana, some journalists point out the fact that the High Council on Audiovisual (HCA), which should have been the key institution in charge of the whole process, was never put in place. 46 According to these journalists, had the HCA been created and given some authorities, the debacle of VIVA Television would have been avoided, since the proper procedure would have been followed by the state and the victim (Andry Rajoelina, in this case). While this hypothesis may be correct afterward, one may also suggest that, had Marc Ravalomanana and his government respected the freedom of expression of all citizens (including the Mayor of Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina), they would not have had to shut down any television stations at all. In other words, the deficiency of the bureaucracy has been compounded in this case by the non-respect of the most fundamental principle of democracy, which is the freedom of expression of all citizens without any exception.
On the other hand, the case of the anti-corruption bureau, known as BIANCO, shows how an institution was created and instrumentalized to eliminate the political and economic competitors of the incumbent president. In 2004, Marc Ravalomanana created BIANCO to fight corruption in the country. However, while the statute of BIANCO required a declaration of wealth from all citizens occupying high positions in the state, Marc Ravalomanana himself refused to abide by this rule. Instead, anyone who was critical of his governance was subjected to an investigation from this institution, in addition to tax audits by tax services. Most studies on these institutions of governance (political parties, legislatures and electoral systems) in Madagascar also demonstrate that either they were typically weak, or they were instrumentalized by the presidents. Thus, assessing the strength of the party system in Madagascar, the World Bank finds that: "The party system is extremely weak in Madagascar, rather than being based around ideologies or aggregating political will, political parties are at the service of key individuals." 48 Marcus and Ratsimbaharison also draw the conclusion that the Malagasy political parties were generally weak, hardly institutionalized, and used by political leaders "as tools of patrimonial rule and not as instruments of democracy." 49 With regard to the legislature, the major factor crippling its effectiveness was the ever increasing power of the successive presidents. Traditionally, Madagascar inherited a "monarchic conception of power," 50 which led to constitutionally powerful presidents, described by some analysts as "Monarchic Presidents" 51 or presidents with "near-imperial role." 52 The Malagasy people themselves consider their successive presidents as "ray aman-dreny" (literally, father-and-mother). Furthermore, during the 3 rd Republic, each president sought to increase their power at the expense of the legislature and the judiciary, through a series of constitutional amendments. As a result, by the time Marc Ravalomanana resigned in March 2009, the president had the constitutional power to rule by decree (taking away even the raison d'être of the legislature) and dissolve the National Assembly any time he wanted. 53 Finally, concerning the electoral systems, the International Crisis Group reports that:
Until 2010, the electoral process was controlled by three institutions: the Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform (MIRA), the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the High Constitutional Court (HCC). The fundamental problem of this way of sharing responsibilities is that it maintains the process under the control of the executive power. Indeed, the Ministry has been always under the thumb of the president, in the same way as the HCC, which has frequently refused to register some candidates; and the composition of the CNE does not allow it to work independently. Besides, the local representatives of the administration are used to exhort the population to support the government in order to make sure that they receive financial supports.
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In addition to this tight control of the electoral process by the executive, other analysts also point out the rampant electoral frauds and irregularities under the 3 rd Republic. Some of the most outrageous practices were the vote buying by some candidates, the intimidations of voters and voting officers, and the orders given by the central government to local government officers to delay or change election results. 55 Once again, as with the political parties and the legislature, the major problem with the electoral system was the monarchic power of the presidents. The presidents of the 3 rd Republic and their respective political parties wanted to win all elections by any means necessary, and that was their reason for controlling the electoral systems, without any regard to democratic principles.
Strengthening Horizontal Accountability and Rule of Law
Concerning the subtask of strengthening horizontal accountability and the rule of law, Larry Diamond states that:
An institutionally mature, resourceful, and autonomous legislature is an important instrument of horizontal accountability. Even in a parliamentary system in which government emerges out of the legislature, the latter is expected to question ministers and hold government accountable. However, elected executives, state bureaucrats, soldiers, and police cannot be held accountable without a judicial system that has the constitutional and political autonomy to ensure a genuine rule of law. Neither can civil liberties be protected and the power of the state constrained without such an institutionalized judicial system. 56 The typical weakness of the legislature under the 3 rd Republic led to the fact that horizontal accountability vis-à-vis the legislature did not exist for the successive presidents. With regard to the judicial system, some analysts also point out the fact that there were "significant efforts to reform" the system, 57 and that the government benefited technical supports from Norway in this area. 58 However, the reality was that, in the same way as the legislature, the judiciary of the 3 rd Republic was weak and completely dominated and manipulated by the successive presidents.
In addition to its total domination by the "Monarchic Presidents," the judiciary also suffered from different financial and technical problems, which have been described by Freedom House as follows:
A lack of training, resources, and personnel hampers judicial effectiveness, and case backlogs are prodigious. The judiciary remains susceptible to corruption and executive influence. Most of the approximately 20,000 people held in the country"s prisons are pretrial detainees and suffer extremely harsh and sometimes lifethreatening conditions. In many rural areas, customary-law courts that lack due process often issue summary and severe punishments. 59 Consequently, the laws were not always respected in Madagascar under the 3 rd Republic. Starting from the top, the successive presidents themselves frequently ignored the constitution and many other laws of the land in their exercise of power. A typical example of the violation of the constitution occurred in 2004, when president Marc Ravalomanana created by decree his "22 regions," in replacement of the "six autonomous provinces," which were established by a constitutional amendment initiated by Didier Ratsiraka in 1998. 60 It is true that the constitutional amendment of 2007 corrected this mistake afterward, but the violation was already done.
Regime Performance
With regard to the task of regime performance, Larry Diamond makes the following observation: "Over time and over a succession of specific governments, the democratic regime must produce sufficiently positive policy outputs to build broad political legitimacy or at least to avoid the crystallization of substantial pockets of resistance to the regime's legitimacy." 61 In connection with this observation, he defines regime performance as "the political outputs and character of the regime, as well as the material conditions it generates (or for which it is seen to be responsible)." 62 He also categorizes it into: -Economic performance, and -Political performance.
Finally, when compared to those of other African countries, particularly its closest neighbor, Mauritius, Madagascar"s recent economic successes were actually mediocre. 70 As Larry Diamond puts it: The better the performance of a democratic regime in producing and broadly distributing improvements in living standards, the more likely it is to endure." 71 In the case of Madagascar, although the 3 rd Republic performed economically better than the previous Republics, the major problems were its failure to address social inequality, to improve the living standard of the population as a whole, and to avoid patrimonializing state resources.
Political Performance
Larry Diamond defines political performance as "political outputs and character of the regime," 72 which may include different political outputs, such as: "physical safety and security, which require protection from arbitrary harm by the state or criminal elements," "prestige of [the] country in world affairs," "peace in foreign relations," "political freedom, accountability, and constitutionalism." Since "political freedom, accountability, and constitutionalism" have been discussed in the previous tasks of deepening democracy (Tasks 2.1 and 2.2), this section will focus on "physical safety and security," "prestige of [the] country in world affairs," and "peace in foreign relations."
Similarly to its economic performance, the political performance of Madagascar"s 3
rd Republic was also a mix of successes and failures. Indeed, the public safety and security, especially in the rural areas, still constitute a huge problem. 74 In addition to the attacks from real criminals, the state itself acted on many occasions, particularly under Marc Ravalomanana, as a predator preying on the political and economic competitors of the president, his political party (TIM) and his companies (Tiko Group). As mentioned earlier, the tax audits by the tax services and the investigation of corruption by BIANCO have been instrumentalized by Marc Ravalomanana to eliminate his political and economic competitors. Concerning the effects of political performance, Larry Diamond states that: "The ability of a new or recent democracy to deliver decent, open, relatively clean governance should not be underestimated as a policy output that can help consolidate democracy." 76 In the case of Madagascar, there is no doubt that the 3 rd Republic performed better than the two previous Republics. However, the problem was the manner in which the economic and political performances were achieved. If they were achieved under a genuine democratic regime, they would tremendously contribute to democratic consolidation. On the contrary, if they were achieved under non-democratic regime, they would undermine the whole process.
THE OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
This section reviews the completion of the three generic tasks of democratic consolidation, in order to identify the major obstacles and challenges to their completion in Madagascar. The assessment of the completion of each task is summarized in Table 1 , 77 along with the corresponding obstacles and challenges.
Table1. Completion of the Three Generic Tasks of Democratic Consolidation In Madagascar (1992-2009)

Task Main Categories Task Sub-Categories Outcomes Obstacles Challenges
Task 1 -Democracy Deepening 78 or Presidents with "near-imperial roles." 79 The willingness of these presidents to increase their power without limit and to eliminate any competitor constituted the major obstacle to the completion of these two important tasks of democratic consolidation. As a result, it can be argued that by 2006, Madagascar"s electoral democracy was clearly deteriorating, and moving away from liberal democracy to autocracy.
In connection with the above considerations, the challenge for the completion of these two tasks is to constrain the presidential power, in order to make the president a "regular citizen" or at least a "firstamong-equal citizen," who must abide by the laws and accept competitions and criticisms from other citizens. This can be a very difficult challenge in a country where most people have a "monarchic conception of power" and consider their president as a ray amandreny (father-and-mother). 80 The discussion on the completion of Task 1.3 -Decentralizing and devolving power to local governments shows that at least Didier Ratsiraka and Marc Ravalomanana attempted some administrative reforms that looked like a decentralization and devolution of power to local governments. However, instead of truly decentralizing and devolving power to local government, these two presidents were actually tightening their control over the whole country, by delegating their power to trusted allies or political appointees, and hence extending their political networks throughout the whole country. Once again, the willingness of the presidents to increase their power without limit and to eliminate any competitor constitutes the major obstacle to a genuine decentralization and devolution of power. And we can, once more, submit that the challenge for the completion of this task was also to constrain the presidential power, in order to make the president a "regular citizen" or at least a "first among equal citizens."
Finally, putting the military under civilian control did not seem to be a daunting task in the case of Madagascar, and this had already been done, according to some analysts. However, the real problem was the internal division, along with the politicization and instrumentalization of the military by political leaders. As stated earlier, Marc Ravalomanana in 2002 and Andry Rajoelina in 2009 owed their rise to power to military interventions. Consequently, the challenge in this case was to "refocus the military"s mission, training and expenditure around issues of external security," 81 in order to prevent its politicization and instrumentalization by political leaders.
The Obstacles and Challenges to Political Institutionalization
The discussion of the completion of Task 2.1 -Strengthening the bureaucracy shows the deficiencies in terms of bureaucracy in Madagascar. However, when bureaucratic institutions existed, they were mostly instrumentalized by the presidents in order to increase their power and to eliminate their competitors. Thus, the challenge to this task is to find and devote financial and human resources to
